True colours of the nuclear deal - Dr. P.K.Iyengar, Former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, India

The US House of Representatives has passed a bill (H. R. 7081) that approves the 123 Agreement, but which is contradictory to the assurance given by the Prime Minister to the nation. An identical version is before the US Senate for voting. Even as late as 26 September 2008, the Prime Minster was seeking an agreement that would ‘satisfy India’. This has not come to pass, and it will be interesting to see how the Indian government and the Indian media will ‘spin’ this into a victory for India. The Indian side is supposed to have been unhappy with the language. The fact is that one is not worried about the language, but the content and compulsions of the Bill.

Why is the House bill not satisfactory? Even the title of the Bill, ‘United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act’, makes it clear that they seek to press their non-proliferation agenda. The Bill makes a number of things explicitly clear, and reveals the true colours of the nuclear deal.

(1) The 123 Agreement is subject to the provisions of the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act, and does not supersede them.
This is said, in so many words, twice in the Bill. Section 101 (page 3, lines 16-21) says that: “The Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, and any other applicable United States law.” Section 102 (page 6, lines 8-12) reiterates that: “Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.” Therefore there is now no question of differences in the ‘interpretation’ of the 123 Agreement. Irrespective of what we think we are bound by, the Americans have made it abundantly clear that they are bound by the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act, and the 123 Agreement does not supersede either of them. If we conduct a test it is now abundantly clear that, as per the provisions of the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act, it is the end of the nuclear deal.

(2) In the event of a disruption of fuel supply from the US, the Americans will not help arrange for fuel from another country.
Article 5(b-iv) of the 123 Agreement says that in the event of fuel disruption the US will help India get fuel from ‘friendly supplier countries’. But it seems that the Congress is having none of this. Section 102 (page 5, lines 4-12) of the Bill explicitly states that in the event of fuel disruption, not only will the US not help arrange for fuel from other countries, but it will also “seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other source.” Since this sentence is not in the 123 Agreement, the Indian government will probably claim that we are not bound by it. However, the simple reality is that if there is a disruption of fuel from America, for whatever reason, the Americans will work hard to ensure that we do not get it from any other source.

(3) There will be no transfer of enrichment technology, and even permission for reprocessing imported fuel may be denied.
This is the most disturbing clause in the Bill. Sec. 204 of the Bill (page 14, lines 11-19) says explicitly that before the 123 Agreement enters into force (according to Article 16), the President has to certify that the US will work with NSG countries to “agree to further restrict the transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel”. So, one of the major advantages we were expecting from the NSG waiver and the 123 Agreement will not be forthcoming. But this Bill goes even further. Section 201 makes it very clear that any future proposal for reprocessing needs explicit approval from the US Congress, and the Congress retains the right to refuse (page 13, lines 1-4). This is a new twist, and extremely dangerous, because it leaves us completely at the mercy of the Congress. The same section also says that the US will pursue efforts with other countries to ensure that reprocessing of fuel from those countries will also be governed by ‘similar arrangements and procedures’. This seems to suggest that the US would even like the existing arrangements with Russia for the Kudankulam reactors to be modified along the proposed lines. The same would also apply to any other supplier. It is surprising that in spite of our being a ‘strategic partner’, the US wants to restrain our fuel-cycle developments. This shows, again, that India is not being treated as an equal, in spite of the fact that for decades India has developed reprocessing and enrichment technology on its own, and produced plutonium for fast-breeder reactors as well as enriched uranium for the submarine reactor.

These explicit statements in the House Bill only reaffirm what many of us have been saying for a long time. The 123 Agreement does not supersede, and is constrained by, the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act. The House Bill has added new constraints. The entire Indo-US nuclear deal, which must now be taken to comprise of the Congress Bill, the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, is in contradiction to the July 2005 Joint Statement, because it doesn’t give India the status of an advanced nuclear state enjoying the same obligations and benefits as others. The nuclear deal does not allow cooperation in enrichment or reprocessing technology. The nuclear deal does not guarantee fuel supplies or a fuel reserve. In the event of a breach of the 123 Agreement, the US will not work with its allies to find alternate solutions – on the contrary it will pressure them to act against Indian interests. ‘Full cooperation’ in civil nuclear power is meaningless without assurances of fuel supply and technological cooperation in the fuel cycle.

The House Bill also makes it clear that the US continues to impose on us the existing non-proliferation regime, and is not ready to recognize India as a nation with advanced nuclear technology. President Bush may have made many promises, but he will not be around to fulfill them. The reality is that the nuclear deal will not bring us as equals to the nuclear table. It will only serve to tighten the non-proliferation regime around us, make us dependent on the nuclear cartel for fuel, and completely cripple our strategic programme.

If the government’s intention is to import nuclear reactors and fuel, a simple bilateral agreement, which guarantees application of safeguards to the reactors, the fuel, and the end products of reprocessing the fuel, would have been sufficient and meaningful. There is already a precedent for this. In the nuclear deal with Russia, the irradiated fuel from the Kudankulam reactors can be reprocessed in India, provided this is done under IAEA safeguards. The plutonium that is produced in these reactors, when separated, will also attract IAEA safeguards. This is perfectly understandable, and India has accepted this. Why this should not be applicable in a more friendly agreement with the US, is incomprehensible.

In 1974, when India was less developed and had a bleaker future, Indira Gandhi  was able to stand firm in supporting a strategic programme, in spite of ominous warnings of the retribution that would follow. It is ironic that in 2008, when India is in a much stronger position, economically and geopolitically, her own party is ready to betray her legacy and put on nuclear shackles, for a few dollars more.

Is the Left Right on Indo-US Nuclear Deal?

For some time now, arguments and counter-arguments in favour of and against the Indo-US Nuclear deal have been appearing in the media though it never has leapt to such prominence as it has now! The reason - both the camps in India - those who argue in favour of the deal and those against it - have almost reached a point of no-return. And now, the question is whether the LEFT is RIGHT ? Let's now attempt to analyse.

Petroleum (Oil), Natural Gas, Electricity, Coal, Renewable and Alternative fuels (including Hydro-power, Solar, Wind, Geothermal, Biomass and Ethanol) are the sources of Energy apart from the Nuclear source. Statistics show that 81.7% of India's Electricity production is Fossil-fuel based and 14.5% from Hydro. India consumes 339 million short tons of Coal per year - third in the world, next only to China and the U.S.A. (Courtesy: www.nationmaster.com). Consuming just 17.8 tera-watt hours of Nuclear Energy per year, India's Nuclear Energy share is a mere 0.7%.

In India, energy is predominantly consumed by the Transportation Sector and according to International Energy Outlook released last year by Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Government, India's transportation energy use is projected to grow at 3.3% per year as against the world average of 1.7% per year. The document anticipates that India will continue to expand its public transportation networks over the projection period, allowing robust increases in both road and rail transport and resulting in a more than doubling of transportation energy use between 2004 and 2030. India launched her National Highways Development Project (NHDP) in 1998 to modernize her major highways. The first phase of the project—the “Golden Quadrilateral,” a 3,625-mile multi-lane highway system that connects Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, and Calcutta—was completed at the end of 2006. The second phase—the North-South and East-West national highways that will connect the outermost points of the country—will comprise more than 4,200 miles of highway.

Then comes the Industrial Sector, Commercial Sector and the Residential Sector. In India, following the Transportation Sector, energy is consumed by Petro-Chemicals and Fertilisers. Only a negligent amount of Oil is used in Power Plants in India. Even according to the U.S. Government document, "Although electricity is expected to become an increasingly important component of industrial sector delivered energy demand in the non-OECD economies, oil, coal, and natural gas were the most heavily used fuels in 2004, and they are projected to remain so in 2030. Liquids use in the non-OECD industrial sector increases at a slower rate than natural gas or coal use. The continued importance of coal in the non-OECD industrial sector is largely attributable to China, which accounts for 70 percent of industrial coal use in the non-OECD economies in 2030."

It is anybody's knowledge that Nuclear source of energy cannot be consumed directly by the Transport Sector - India's predominant consuming sector! After all, Oil cannot be substituted in this sector by any other form of energy. However, it is also common knowledge that Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas project, if materialises, will definitely reduce, if not eliminate, the pressure on the economy due to spiralling Oil prices. Our analysis revolves around the stand of the UPA Government at the Centre vis-a-vis the Left parties that support the Government on these two major policy decisions - one, emphasis on the Nuclear deal that is projected to be save the country from all our energy-related problems; and two, lacklustre attitude in finalising the Iran Gas Project as if it were not to benefit the country's quest for energy.

It is hard to ignore the following fact sheet put forth by the Left Parties under these circumstances.

· India's growing shortage of electricity has little to do with a lack of nuclear energy but a lot to do with starving the power sector of public investments over the last two decades. In the last three Five-year plans, capacity additions has been of around 20,000 MW per Plan, less than what we had added in the 7th Plan.

· Even if the Deal is signed today, it will take about 8 years before any electricity is produced from imported reactors under the Deal

· The cost of installing nuclear power plants using imported reactors is three times that of coal-fired plants of the same size

· The cost of electricity from such plants will be more than Rs. 5.00, twice that from coal-fired plants

· The quickest and cheapest way to remove the current electricity shortages is to build coal-fired plants which take half the time required by nuclear plants

· Nuclear plants require imported uranium, which is controlled by a small international cartel. The price of uranium has gone up by five times in the last few years because of this cartel.

· Nuclear energy has an important place in India's energy option and this route needs to be kept open for the future. However, this should be based on our indigenous technology and our indigenous resources to ensure energy security.

· Even with the most optimistic nuclear scenario that the Government has projected, Nuclear energy will at best meet only 8% of our electricity demand and about 4% of our total primary energy demand. While the nuclear option should be kept open for the future, it has little importance for meeting our immediate energy needs.

The question before the people of India should, therefore, be not about the loss of face for the architects of the Nuclear deal - the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the U.S. President George Bush, but about preserving the independence and sovereignty of the great country whose Foreign Policy has stood the test of time for its inherent non-aligned nature.