Is Indo-Chinese relationship at crossroads?

Over the turn of the last century, the world has changed dramatically. Recently falling into the grip of recession of an unprecedented kind, the already declining trend of American global dominance apparently has suffered a further accelerated pace of deterioration. On the other hand, emerging economies like that of India and China have already gained international recognition, no matter howsoever 'grudgingly'. Perhaps, owing to their domestic market size coupled with certain other positive factors, the serious nature of the global recession has not critically impacted these fast-growing economies though the pace has indeed slowed down. Though it may be premature at this stage to envision a depolarisation drastically reversing the equations, a visible tilt in favour of the two Asian giants is already conceivable. It is in this background that Indo-Chinese relationship has assumed greater significance than ever before.

The Background

India and China have many things in common. Whether it be on their firm-rooted, distinct and rich cultural values, heritage, classic languages, martial arts, spirituality, legacies in the realms of social sciences, health and medicine, astronomy and astrology or even the most modern nuclear and space technology, both the countries have abundant knowledge and resources to their credit. If Kenneth Waltz's prescription of ingredients contributing to the might that will change polar equations are to be believed, both the countries have the strength to dictate with the size of their population, territory, resources, economic wealth, military strength and competence. But only if they stand together. An unassailable bondage of friendship between these two countries will be a boon not only to these two, but also to those who entertain no hidden agenda among the international community. It is left to anyone's guess as to who, among the community of nations, would be worried over such a prospect emerging out of Indo-Chinese friendship. It is also an 'open secret' that the beneficiary in the event of a bitter relationship between India and China would do all that is possible to play a spoil sport!

It is unfortunate that certain recent developments appear to trigger a genuine concern even in the minds of the advocates of Indo-Chinese friendship as these developments indicate that the relationship between the two countries could be hurt even in the absence of a visible third party playing the foul game! Unless urgent steps are initiated by both the countries to stem the rot, the consequences would be a blessing in disguise for certain vested interests while proving to undo whatsoever gains that India and China could make with their positive dialogues during the recent past.

The thorn

It will not be far from truth if origin of the differences in perception between India and China is attributed to the British who have the notoriety of fishing in the troubled waters with their divide and rule policy. When the British left India, they not only had sown the seeds of animosity between sections of peoples within the vast territory of land that they once ruled, but also had paved the way for eventual disharmony between two great civilisations that overthrew imperialist dreams of perpetual exploitation. The eventual multiple wars that India fought with Pakistan and for once in 1962 with China were nothing, but the effect of the British seeds of hatred and animosity. The continued strained relationship with our neighbours is the legacy that modern India inherited. However, it will be unfair to blame the British game alone for the current state of affairs as we had ample time at our disposal to get the wounds heal. Had there been systematic, well-thought and far-sighted diplomatic endeavours put into practice, things might not have worsened to the extent to which it has now. There could be arguments for and against the foreign policies pursued by successive Indian Government following the country's independence. But the single fact that remains - the unresolved border issues with our neighbours - amply speak for themselves the inadequacies in the effectiveness of our policies. Perhaps, the only tangible gain that India made over these post-independence negotiations with our neighbours is the Chinese abandonment of claim over Sikkim. If at all, it was a diplomatic victory for India rather than a voluntary concession from China, given the areas of disagreement between the neighbours, its significance did not mean much. The often repeated assertion by diplomats on either side of the border that all-out efforts are made to resolve issues through dialogue does not catch up with the imaginations any more.

History

Historically, British India and China (recognising Tibet as the integral part of China) share a long border that stretch from today's Pakistan in the West to Myanmar (formerly Burma) in the East, running through the Himalayan region, also bordering Nepal and Bhutan. The British had not resolved all the outstanding border issues with Chinese before they left India leaving the disputed border legacy.

The prime disputed pieces of land comprise of --

(1) the Aksai Chin located in the north-western region of the Tibetan plateau with an area of about 37,250 sq.km., mostly a desert at high altitude ranging between 16,000 to 18,000 feet above sea level, now administered by China as part of its Xinjiang Autonomous region, but forming part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir that was acceded to India. Aksai Chin was historically part of the Himalayan Kingdom of Ladakh until the 19th Century when it was annexed to the princely State of Kashmir;

(2) the Trans-Karakoram tract comprising Shaksgam and Shigar valleys of Baltistan, part of Ladakh province that formed part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, has an area of about 5,800 sq. km., and was not only occupied by Pakistan, but also was ceded to China in settlement of the Sino-Pakistan border under a 1963 bilateral agreement that was subject to final settlement of the Kashmir dispute;

(3) the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh, with about 84 sq.km. in area, that borders with Assam and Nagaland States of India towards its South and South-East respectively, and Myanmar (former Burma) towards its East, Bhutan towards its West and China towards its North. China claims Arunachal Pradesh as the southern strip of Tibet that belongs to it. During the British rule of India, there was an attempt between China and British India to negotiate their border settlement some time in 1913-14. As part of the exercise, Sir Henry McMahon drew up a line of about 900 km. (eventually called McMahon line) between British India and Tibet. It was a tripartite conference comprising representatives of China, Tibet and British India. While Tibet and British India agreed to the proposal and Tibet actually proceeded with ceding Tawang and some other pieces of its land to British India, the Chinese backed out over failure to reach accord on some issues related to inner border with Tibet. This left the McMahon line unrecognised by the Chinese while India considers it sacrosanct since 1950s after several zig-zag positions.

In 1962, a Sino-Indian war erupted that lasted just for one month between October-November. Different versions exist for the culmination of minor skirmishes on the border into a war, but though the Chinese had advanced into Indian territories within the Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA) and Ladakh area, they unilaterally declared a ceasefire and returned to their positions - in the south, beyond the McMahon line. It is believed that the Indians granting asylum to the Dalai Lama following the unsuccessful 1959 Tibetan uprising could also be a provocation for the Chinese aggression in 1962. The events that led to the war would lead one to believe that the war was unintended. But flexing of muscles without adequate preparations by India in her attempt to force the Chinese away from the unsettled border areas, perhaps, at one stage, went out of control leaving the Chinese with no alternative than retaliating with excessively disproportionate and unanticipated force and speed. The 1962 Sino-Indian war was unique inasmuch as there was no role for the Navy and Air Force units of both the countries!

Lessons learnt

During and in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 war, a strong current of nationalism was prevailing all over India. Indians did not consider the Forward Policy pursued by Indian Army that created outposts intruding even beyond the McMahon line as a tactical folly. An impression had gained in India that the Chinese aggression ran contrary to India's efforts to make peace with neighbours, particularly in the wake of 1954 Nehru-Zhou En Lai Pancha Sheel declaration terming Indo-Chinese friendship as that of 'brotherhood'. The public outrage against China had gone to the extent of arresting several Communist leaders and detaining them without trial for months only for them having expressed their views that was against blaming China for the war.

It took almost three decades after the war for tempers to cool down. Both the countries learnt their own lessons from history. India started adopting a pragmatic line of negotiated settlement of boundary disputes. During the regime of Rajiv Gandhi as the Prime Minister of India, there was a policy shift on relations with China. Perhaps, the Sino-Russian border settlement of 1987 that saw a negotiated peaceful settlement after several years of dispute was an eye-opener.

During 1990s, we could see considerable progress in relationship between India and China with the 1993 and 1996 agreements focussing on peace, tranquillity and confidence building measures (CBMs). Eventually, negotiations between the two neighbours resulted in setting up of Expert Groups to go into the intricacies of the border dispute and explore common ground, gradually narrow down areas of disagreement and leading to a final resolution of all issues. This exercise having commenced close to the turn of the millennium, has made only small gains in narrowing down the differences between the experts on either side over the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) along the 545 km. long stretch covering the Indian States of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and Tibet on the Chinese side. Maps have been exchanged between the two parties making clear the understanding of each other's perceptions. Things started progressing slowly, but steadily.

Turn of events

However, 2009 does not appear to be as good a year as it had been over the past few years in respect of the Indo-Chinese relationship. The recent developments that include more frequent Chinese intrusions into Indian territory, the 'Google map' controversy, formal Chinese objection to Indian Prime Minister's visit to Arunachal Pradesh for election campaign, reports on discriminatory Visas being issued by China to Kashmiri Indians and construction of a dam on the Chinese side of Brahmaputra, do not point to improving relationship between the neighbours. Notwithstanding the media hype, the Government of India has consistently been adopting a reconciliatory position towards China, while equally and unequivocally sticking to known positions. According to India's Secretary to External Affairs Ministry, Nirupama Rao, Indo-Chinese border dispute is one of the most complex international disputes that should be handled with care and determination on both sides to gain common ground.

Let us watch how this diplomatic challenge is handled in the days to come, fingers crossed!

Photograph Courtesy:

Wikipedia (for Kashmir disputed region map)

Xinhua (for Indo-Chinese Diplomats during 2009 August talks)